Collective Philanthropy: Describing and Modeling the Ecology of Giving by Gottesman, William L. et al.
Collective Philanthropy: Describing and Modeling the Ecology of Giving
William L. Gottesman,1, ∗ Andrew James Reagan,2, 1, † and Peter Sheridan Dodds2, 1, ‡
1 Computational Story Lab, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, 05401
2 Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Center for Complex Systems,
& the Vermont Advanced Computing Core, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, 05401
(Dated: November 9, 2018)
Reflective of income and wealth distributions, philanthropic gifting appears to follow an approxi-
mate power-law size distribution as measured by the size of gifts received by individual institutions.
We explore the ecology of gifting by analysing data sets of individual gifts for a diverse group of
institutions dedicated to education, medicine, art, public support, and religion. We find that the
detailed forms of gift-size distributions differ across but are relatively constant within charity cate-
gories. We construct a model for how a donor’s income affects their giving preferences in different
charity categories, offering a mechanistic explanation for variations in institutional gift-size distri-
butions. We discuss how knowledge of gift-sized distributions may be used to assess an institution’s
gift-giving profile, to help set fundraising goals, and to design an institution-specific giving pyramid.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The scope and health of philanthropic institutions con-
tribute substantively to the cultural and economic well-
being of a great diversity of societal institutions. Between
1970 and 2010 Americans gave approximately 2% of their
disposable income to philanthropic causes [1]. The dis-
tribution of income in the United States and many other
countries has long been described by various heavy tailed
distributions including power law, log-normal, Boltzman,
and combinations thereof [2–4]. Similar distributions
have been found in the size of gifts to charitable caus-
es [5].
Here, our aims are to (1) examine empirical data for an
approximate power-law size distribution model of phil-
anthropic behavior; (2) describe a general mathemat-
ical model for philanthropic gifting in a manner that
gives greater insight into how different organizations raise
money and how individuals choose the amounts of their
gifts; and (3) explore the usefulness of our findings on
current fundraising practices [6]. We have chosen the
power law distributions for the sake of simplicity and to
aid development of a primitive model describing heavy-
tailed gifting behavior capable of addressing basic ques-
tions about philanthropy. We wish to emphasize that
we do not claim that gift size distributions are per-
fectly described as ’true’ power laws generated by some
underlying mechanism(s) not yet elucidated. Rather, we
use power law approximations—linear approximations in
logarithmic coordinates—to gain some traction in our
description and to provide a way to carry out some ideal-
ized analysis, fully appreciating the appromixate nature
of our work. Larger, much more comprehensive data sets
∗Electronic address: billgottesman@gmail.com
†Electronic address: andrew.reagan@uvm.edu
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will certainly advance our understanding beyond what
we have been able to achieve here.
As a foundation for our investigations, we have con-
structed a data set spanning a wide range of institutional
categories. We obtained anonymous gift data for a total
of six institutions:
• two educational institutions: University of Ver-
mont, Burlington, VT, and Albert Einstein Med-
ical School, Bronx, NY,
• one health care institution: Mt. Sinai Hospital in
Manhattan, NY,
• one combined purpose organization: United Way
of Chittenden County, VT,
• one local cultural and educational organization:
ECHO Science Center in Burlington, VT,
• and one arts center: Flynn Theater in Burlington,
VT.
Our central characterization of gift-size distributions
will be through measuring power-law exponents for the
paired statistics of Zipf distributions [7] and gift-size fre-
quency distributions, and we explain both now. First, the
Zipf distribution for a list of gifts is generated by ranking
gifts in order of descending monetary size. Writing gift
size as S and gift rank as r, an ideal Zipf distribution
obeys:
S ∼ r−α, (1)
where we will call α the Zipf exponent. Alternately, we
can compile a gift-size frequency distribution: for each
gift size S, we record the number of such gifts N(S).
Again for an ideal system, we would observe
N(S) ∼ S−γ . (2)
Both views have their merits: Zipf distributions follow
a very natural construction and are simple to interpret,
Typeset by REVTEX
ar
X
iv
:1
30
7.
22
78
v3
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  3
 M
ay
 20
14
20 1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 
 
 A Mount Sinai Hospital
Year      α       γ
2010  0.98  2.02
2009  1.09  1.92
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 B EinsteinSchool of Medicine
Year      α       γ
2010  1.25  1.80
2009  1.19  1.84
2008  1.25  1.80
2007  1.41  1.71
2006  1.27  1.79
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 C University of Vermont
Year      α       γ
2010  1.23  1.81
2000  1.40  1.71
1990  0.87  2.16
1980  1.17  1.85
1974  1.06  1.94
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 D United Way ofChittenden County
Year      α       γ
2010  0.68  2.47
2009  0.65  2.55
2008  0.66  2.53
2007  0.70  2.42
2006  0.70  2.42
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 E ECHO Science Museum
Year      α       γ
2009  1.36  1.73
2008  1.77  1.56
2007  1.71  1.59
2006  1.69  1.59
2005  1.52  1.66
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 F Flynn Theater
Year      α       γ
2010  0.92  2.09
2009  0.85  2.18
2008  0.87  2.15
2007  0.87  2.15
2006  0.85  2.18
FIG. 1: Gift size distributions for a range of institutions. The reported α and γ were fitted to the region indicated by solid
grey line, and the 95% CI of this fit, as well as year for which the fit is plotted, are included for each organization. The ranges
over which the data were fit was chosen empirically; other approaches were found to be inconsistent (see Supplementary). A.
Health Care: Mt. Sinai Hospital, 2010 had γ = 2.02 ± 0.10. B. Higher Education (Medical): Einstein School of Medicine,
2010 had γ = 1.80 ± 0.06. C. Higher Education (General): University of Vermont, 2010 had γ = 1.81 ± 0.05. D. Combined
Purpose: United Way, 2010 had γ = 2.47± 0.09. E. Cultural: ECHO Aquarium and Science Center, 2009 had γ = 1.73± 0.15.
F. Performing Arts: Flynn Theater, Burlington VT, 2010 had γ = 2.09 ± 0.05. Later in Fig. 13, we show similar data for an
anonymous religious institution. Dates and amounts of all contributions were collected over time periods ranging from 2 years
to 37 years. United Way and Mt. Sinai Hospital were the only organizations able to ensure that annual donor gift amounts
reflected that year’s total of donations by a single donor, rather than individually posting multiple gifts made by a single donor
during that year.
while power-law size distributions most clearly represent
a system’s probabilistic behavior. Later in our analyses,
we will consider the probability density P (S), the nor-
malized version of N(S).
We can show that the two distributions are related by
considering the complementary cumulative distribution
function, the number of gifts of at least size S: N≥(S).
We see that N≥(S) is equivalent to the rank of S, mean-
ing N≥(S) = r ∼ S−1/α using Eq. (1). A simple calcu-
lation starting from the size frequency distribution gives
N≥(S) =
∑Smax
S′=S N(S
′) ∼ S−(γ−1). The exponents are
therefore connected as:
α =
1
γ − 1 . (3)
Empirically, a typical range for α is 1/2 to 1 with these
limits corresponding to 3 and 2 for γ. For 2 < γ < 3,
we have the ‘statistics of surprise’: gifts are typically
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FIG. 2: 2005 data showing how donors of different income groups distribute their charitable giving. For example, on average
donors earning less than $100,000 chose to direct 67% of their total giving to religious causes, panel A, but donors earning
more than one million dollars chose instead to direct 17%, panel D. CP Funds stands for Combined Purpose Funds.
small but the variance is very large being dominated by
the largest gifts. If γ < 2, we have an even more extreme
circumstance of the average gift size being typically large
as well.
In what follows, we will generally present figures show-
ing Zipf’s distribution. We will estimate Zipf’s α with a
Maximum Likelihood (ML) approach [8], and then deter-
mine γ using Eq. (3). We provide details of these calcu-
lations including comparisons to other potential distri-
butions in the Supplementary Material (see Fig. S1 and
Tabs. S1 and S2.) In spite of our choice for figures and
for the purposes of analysis, we will prefer to describe
our findings using the gift-size distribution exponent γ,
though occasionally we will use Zipf’s α when more con-
venient.
Due to the real-world nature of our data sets, our mea-
surements are necessarily not exact. Further, we are not
stating that all philanthropic gift-size distributions pos-
sess idealized power-law tails. Power-law statistics are
notoriously difficult to estimate and, moreover, convinc-
ingly showing that a power law even applies is itself a
fraught endeavor [8, 9]. Nevertheless, assuming approx-
imate power-law tails is reasonable and gives us a ser-
viceable diagnostic tool for building and challenging our
descriptions and theory.
We present our work in the following manner. In
Sec. II, we present and give an overall analysis of our six
philanthropic-giving data sets. In Sec. III, we propose
an explanation for the variation in gift-size distributions
across institutions, based on the gift-giving preferences
of individual donors. In Sec. IV we give recommenda-
tions for fundraisers concerning the so-called ‘top 12 rule’,
fundraising pyramids, organization fundraising capacity,
and data collection. We provide concluding remarks in
Sec. V.
II. BASIC EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In Fig. 1, we show gift-size Zipf distributions for our
six organizations, organized by calendar year for a total
of 27 distributions. For each year’s distribution for each
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α = 1.25
γ = 1.80
α = 0.68
 γ = 2.47
Einstein School of Medicine, 2010
United Way, Chittendon County, 2010
FIG. 3: Comparison of 2010 giving to two organizations
with a similar number of donors, and similarly sized smaller
gifts. Despite these similarities, The Albert Einstein School
of Medicine was able to attract top ranked gifts that were
approximately 30 times larger than those of the United Way
of Chittenden County, and raise 10 times the total, because
Einstein enjoyed a substantially lower γ than United Way.
institution, we estimate α and γ, indicating the fitting
region with a solid grey line.
Our initial observation is that data for each organi-
zation in Figure 1 is highly skewed and are generally
well fit by decaying power laws. Four of the six insti-
tutions are particularly robust with the exceptions being
Mt. Sinai Hospital (Fig. 1A), which deviates from a sim-
ple power law after the first few hundred donors, and
ECHO Science Museum, which shows the effect of pro-
viding strong gift categories, leading in its case to a shelf
at $1000 (Fig. 1E). Examples of similar smaller shelves
can be seen in the other distributions at natural values
of $50, $100, and so on.
We also see that institutions show remarkable consis-
tency across years. For example, in the case of the Uni-
versity of Vermont (Fig. 1C), we see Zipf’s α and its
related γ are relatively stable across three decades of gift
rank, as well as over a range of 8,000 to 31,000 gifts per
year. We also see that idiosyncratic distributions such
as those of Mount Sinai (break in scaling, Fig. 1A) and
ECHO Science Museum ($1000 shelf, Fig. 1E) are strong-
ly preserved from year to year.
As mentioned above, smaller values of γ are associ-
ated with more extreme distributions skewed towards
very large gifts. The two educational institutions pos-
sess extreme distributions with γ ' 1.8–1.9 < 2, and
their average gift sizes are relatively large. By contrast,
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α = 0.71
γ = 2.41
α = 0.64
γ = 2.56
Income, 2001
Charitable Deduction, 2001
FIG. 4: Data from IRS 2001 tax returns for personal income
and charitable deductions. On average, people claimed char-
itable deductions at a rate of 2.9% of their income. The
top 0.15% of tax filers gave at a higher rate averaging 4.8%,
resulting in a γ for charitable deductions slightly lower (2.41)
that that for income (2.56). Fits were computed using linear
regression in log-log space, after attempts to use maximum
likelihood methods failed due to finite size bias. Since income
was reported as bin average, we found the rank of the individ-
ual with that average by assuming a power law distribution
within each bin with γ equal to the fit for the whole distribu-
tion. This procedure was bootstrapped (as the new individual
ranks changes the whole distribution γ) until convergence of
γ within 10−3.
United Way has a γ ' 2.5 > 2 meaning its average gift
is small but large ones are possible.
To provide an initial summary, these distributions sug-
gest four notable characteristics of philanthropic gifting:
1. The distribution of the size of philanthropic gifts
received is qualitatively described with a power-law
relationship.
2. Within a given institution, the gift-size distribution
exponent γ remains nearly constant year-to-year.
3. As indicated by the similar values of γ for the two
higher education institutions, γ may be relatively
constant within a single philanthropic category.
4. The gift-size distribution exponent γ varies consid-
erably between philanthropic categories.
Of the number of questions raised by these observa-
tions, we will focus in particular on one: Why does γ
vary among different categories of philanthropic institu-
tions? Our concrete goal will be to model how giving
50.5 1 2 4 10 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
Giving ratioR
e
la
ti
v
e
S
iz
e
o
f
T
o
ta
l
D
o
n
a
ti
o
n
s
 
 
Education, γ ≈ 1.88
Health, γ ≈ 1.97
Arts, γ ≈ 2.15
Reference, γ ≈ 2.41
Combined Purpose, γ ≈ 2.48
Religion, γ ≈ 2.73
FIG. 5: Examples of multipliers as a function of total dona-
tions and institutional categories as calculated by Equation
8. The X-axis measures the size of an individual’s total dona-
tions relative to that of the index case of size 1. We calculated
values of γ from the average of all years of data shown in Figs.
1 and 13C. Education γ is an average of γ’s from University of
Vermont and Albert Einstein School of Medicine; Health γ is
from Mt. Sinai Hospital, Arts γ is from Flynn Theater, Com-
bined Purpose γ is from United Way of Chittenden County,
Reference γ is from IRS 2001 charitable deductions Fig. 4,
and Religion γ is from Fig. 13C. Our model breaks down at
extreme high and extreme low incomes where the multiplier
could calculate a gift that would exceed 100% of that persons
total charitable giving.
behavior of people at different income levels influences
the gift-size exponent γ.
As we show in Fig. 2, there is considerable variation
in donor behavior based on income, and this provides
some insight for our next step forward. The data we use
here comes from the Indiana University Center for Phi-
lanthropy 2005 Study on Charitable Giving by Income
Group which found in particular that a person’s income
level is strongly informative of the type of institution they
prefer to support [10]. Donors earning less than $100,000
per year, for example, give a higher percent of their phil-
anthropic dollars (8.6%) to combined purpose funds (e.g.
United Way) than do those earning more than $1,000,000
per year and direct only 4% of their philanthropic dollars
toward such charities. The opposite is true for education,
toward which donors with incomes less than $100,000
direct only 3% of their philanthropic dollars, while people
earning more than $1,000,000 direct 25% of their giving.
As such, we would expect that educational institutions
would have a much lower γ (associated with higher aver-
age gift sizes) than combined purpose funds. Our data
bears this out, with a γ of 1.81 for University of Vermont,
and 2.47 for United Way of Chittenden County (2010).
To make some headway with this issue of varying γ, we
first need to examine how gift-size distributions differ in
more detail. In Fig. 3, we show that the Albert Einstein
School of Medicine and the United Way of Chittenden
County have a similar sized donor base, both with the
2000th donor giving approximately $200, yet the largest
gifts to Einstein are roughly 30 times those of the United
Way. How do we explain this? The answer is not as
simple as that all donors to Einstein give a multiple of
what they would give the the United Way: this would not
change the slope (i.e., α or γ) of the Zipf or frequency
distributions in log-log space.
As a first attempt, we start with the reasonable
assumption that larger donations originate from wealthi-
er donors. In terms of Zipf distributions, gift sizes will be
ranked in the same order as the donors who give them,
according to their wealth. If we therefore know, for a
given time period, the distribution of the total amount
donated by each individual across a population, we can
estimate how much individuals, as a function of their
income, must relatively give to specific charity categories
to obtain the specific distributions (i.e., values of γ) we
observe in Fig. 1.
With this motivation, we turn to evidence that
describes how income and gift-giving are related within
the United States. The 2001 IRS tax return data shown
in Figure 4 compares reported income to reported char-
itable deductions. On average, Americans donated 2.9%
of their income, with deductions for charitable giving
appearing nearly proportionate to income. When plotted
in Zipf format and fitted to a power law distribution, γ
for charitable giving (γ = 2.41) is slightly smaller than
that for income (γ = 2.56), favoring donating a slightly
higher percentage of income by wealthier individuals.
To move ahead, we now need to be able to compare two
arbitrary Zipf distributions whether they be Zipf distri-
butions of individual wealth or gift sizes. For ease of lan-
guage, consider gifts given to a specific institution with
α = αinst = 1/(γinst − 1), and total donations made by
individuals in a population with α = αpop = 1/(γpop−1).
We want to know how the first ranked (largest) donation
to the institution compares with the first total amount
donated by the population, and so on, down to the last
ranked donation. We derive this relationship by starting
with the Zipf distributions:
Sinst(r) ∼ r−αinst and Spop(r) ∼ r−αpop (4)
which, by isolating and equating ranks, immediately
gives us
Sinst(r)
−1/αinst ∼ Spop(r)−1/αpop . (5)
Using α = 1/(γ−1), we then have that the size Sinst(r) of
a gift to the institution is related to the similarly ranked
total amount donated by an individual Spop(r) according
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FIG. 6: Allocation of donor giving choices as a function of income. Columns represent 2005 donor survey data [9]. Connected
squares represent our model of multipliers calculated from the values of γ described in Figure 5. The multiplier model agrees
qualitatively with the donor survey data.
to
Sinst(r) = cSpop(r)
(γpop−1)/(γinst−1), (6)
where c = Sinst(r∗) [Spop(r∗)]
−(γpop−1)/(γinst−1) with r∗
being any reference ranking.
We determine how much two individuals i and j in our
theoretical population relatively give to the institution.
If these individuals have wealth ranks ri and rj (which
by assumption are their donation ranks as well), then
using Eq. (6), we have
Sinst(rj)
Sinst(ri)
=
[
Spop(rj)
Spop(ri)
] (γpop−1)/(γinst−1)
. (7)
Finally, we can compute a multiplier M which is the
ratio of gift sizes to an institution normalized by the total
donated by individuals i and j:
M =
[
Sinst(rj)
Spop(rj)
]
[
Sinst(ri)
Spop(ri)
] = [Spop(rj)
Spop(ri)
] (γpop−γinst)/(γinst−1)
. (8)
We can now use Eq. (8) to transform the distribution of
personal giving (and relatedly, that of income) into the
distributions for giving to various categories of philan-
thropy. First, we estimate γpop using the 2001 IRS char-
itable deduction data as a reference distribution, giving
γpop ' 2.41. Employing Eq. (8), we then calculate mul-
tipliers for what people of different total donating levels
would have to give to achieve the gift-size distribution
exponent γinst.
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α = 1.54
γ = 1.65
Romney, 2010
McCain, 2006
Obama, 2011
HW Bush, 1990
Clinton, 1992
Nixon, 1972
FIG. 7: Charitable gifts of candidates for the United States
President from their publicly released federal tax returns.
Again due to finite size bias of maximum likelihood meth-
ods, we adopted linear regression for fitting the distribution
scaling parameter γ. The included fit is for President Rom-
ney’s gifts during the year of 2010. We include the fitted γ’s
for each president and the range of their fit in the supplemen-
tary material as Table S3, and we show comparisons to other
distributions in Table S4.
w
Working from our data sets, we show in Fig. 5 mul-
tipliers for six types of institutions, using an income of
$25,000 as an arbitrary reference for convenience.
We see that the multiplier varies strongly across
income level and institutional type. Consider for exam-
ple that the United Way, which has γinst = 2.47, serves
as our example for combined purpose funds. Because
the United Ways gift-size distribution is fairly close to
that of the populations giving distribution (γpop ' 2.41),
the multiplier is close to unity. Thus, if a person with
a total donation level of S directs a certain fraction of
their charitable dollars to the United Way, we expect
a person with a total donation 10 times as large, 10S,
to also direct a similar fraction of their charitable dol-
lars there as well resulting in a gift approximately 10
times larger (Fig. 5, blue squares). The multiplier here
is 10(2.47−1.80)/(1.80−1) ' 0.9, which means as a percent-
age of his total giving, gift from the wealthier person
is 0.9 times the gift from the less wealthy person, but in
absolute terms, the gift is 9 times larger because his total
donation level is 10 times larger.
By contrast, for the University of Vermont for which
γinst ' 1.81, the multiplier now depends strongly on
income level. If the same person with a total donation
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FIG. 8: Model for differing institutional values of γ. A.
Gift distribution using 2001 IRS deduction γ = 2.41 ranks
the total of each donor’s gifts (solid black line), and value of
donor gifts 1 through 5 (dotted lines). Inset shows the five
gifts made by donor of rank #316 (2.5=log10316) according
to a donor γ = 1.8. B. Institution gift distribution attracting
top gift from donor 1, and 5th gift from donor 10,000, γ =
2.08 per Eq. (9). C. Institution gift distribution attracting
5th gift from donor 1, and top gift from donor 10,000, γ =
3.04 per Eq. (9).
of S were now to direct some of their charitable dol-
lars to the University of Vermont, the higher income per-
son would give a multiplier of 10(2.47−1.81)/(1.81−1) ' 4.0,
times more of their annual total donations to the same
institution (Fig. 5, green circles). Note that the absolute
value of the gift has increased 40 times: 10 times from
the larger income, and 4 times from the multiplier effect.
We can superimpose these multipliers onto the 2005
Study on Charitable Giving by Income Group data. We
do so in Figure 6 which is a rearrangement of the same
data displayed in Figure 2, binned according to the IRS
income data in Figure 4. The columns in Figure 6 rep-
resent data collected from surveys of individual donors.
The lines are the calculated multipliers, shown in Fig-
ure 5, generated from the values of γ shown in Figures
1 and 13C. These are two independent data sets: the
former represents data from the gift givers, and the lat-
ter is represents data from the gift receivers. They agree
qualitatively, describing the same story but from different
perspectives.
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FIG. 9: Expected total amount raised in comparison to
amount raised by top 12 donors. For low γ institutions, a
larger number of donors has a relatively small effect on the
total raised. For higher γ institutions, a large donor pool has
a greater effect on the total raised.
III. A PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR
VARYING SLOPES
We have so far been able to describe how giving pat-
terns must vary across institutional type as a function of
institutional giving profiles and donor wealth. We now
attempt to explain in part the origin of these variable
donation patterns.
In many systems where multiple, dependent power-law
size distributions appear, the exponents involved are typ-
ically related through simple algebraic expressions [11].
And while exponents may be tun-able as a function of
independent model parameters [12], smoothly varying
relationships between scaling exponents—the kind we
have here—are unusual. Thus we seek to explain part of
the giving mechanism that connects γpop to γinst as being
something more than merely “Power-Law In, Power-Law
Out” (PLIPLO).
We start by looking at the giving behavior of individ-
ual donors, who will differ in terms of the number of
gifts they make, the size of these gifts, and their per-
sonal ranking of target institutions. They may choose
to make their largest gift to health, their next largest to
education, and so on. We would like examine data that
characterizes the giving behaviors of these donors, such
as through examination of itemized charitable deductions
on federal tax returns. While this private information is
generally inaccessible, some presidential candidates have
released their tax returns publicly, and we can use this
data as a rough guide. Fig. 7 shows itemized deductions
for several candidates, plotted on log-log scales. These
donations, ranked largest to smallest, are visually con-
sistent with an approximate power law Zipf distribution
with gamma ranging from 2 to 3, with an average around
2.5 (see the supplementary material, Tabs. S3 and S4).
For simplicity, we will again presume that gifts made by
individual donors can be adequately described by a power
law Zipf distribution. We can then propose a mechanism
that uses donor choices to explain the different gammas
we see among philanthropic institutions.
In Fig. 8A, we assume a gift size distribution with
γpop = 2.41 and plot the top five gifts using a rough
estimate of αdonor = 1.8. The inset shows the head of
the Zipf distribution for an example donor.
Fig. 8B shows the gift distribution for an institution
with strong appeal to the #1 donor garnering their
top gift, but interest in this institution monotonically
decreases among ranked donors until it attracts the 5th
gift from the final donor. This generates a low γ consis-
tent with, for example, the Einstein School of Medicine
illustrated in Fig. 3. Fig. 8C shows the opposite arrange-
ment of donor appeal, leading to a high γ profile more
typical of a religious institution.
Following this prescription we can straightforwardly
derive an institution’s Zipf exponent αinst (and corre-
sponding γinst) as a function of a donor’s Zipf exponent
αdonor, the population’s Zipf exponent αpop (e.g., from
the IRS charitable deduction distribution), the rank of
the first donor’s and final donor’s gift choice, and the
number of donors N , As defined by our power law mod-
el, such a relationship is linear in log space, the slope of
which equals −αinst. We have
αinst = −
(
log10(Last ranked donor’s gift)
− log10(First ranked donor’s gift)
)
log10N − log10 1
where the size of the first ranked donor’s gift is given by
k(Rank of first donor’s choice)−αdonor
and the size of the last ranked (Nth) donor’s gift is
k(Rank of final donor’s choice)−αdonorN−αpop .
Substituting these equations into the equation for slope
and simplifying gives the relationship we seek:
αinst = αpop+
αdonor
log10N
log10
(
Rank of final donor′s choice
Rank of first donor′s choice
)
.
(9)
For the example Fig. 8B and C, the above gives a range
of γinst from around 2 to 3. While the rank of first and
final donors’ choices are fixed integers, the relationship
will in practice be statistical.
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FIG. 10: Panel A: Accumulation of gifts to University of Vermont in 2010 in the order they were received demonstrates
super-linear growth. Accumulation appears linear until an uncommonly large gift is received. Panel B: Trend lines intersect
the vertical axis at the expected maximum gift and show how the expected maximum gift grows with the number of donors
according to Eq. (9).
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FIG. 11: Fundraising pyramids customized to an institutions γ. Using a power-law model of fundraising, low γ institutions
should plan for and request much higher top level gifts than high γ institutions.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FUNDRAISERS
A. The Top-12 Rule
When undertaking a capital campaign, an institution
will want to estimate the fundraising capacity of its com-
munity. Capital campaigns tend be be a more focused
fundraising effort targeting fewer donors than the annu-
al campaigns reported in this paper. We have collected
some preliminary data suggesting an institution’s capi-
tal campaign γ tends to be less than that of its annu-
al campaign, resulting in a more extreme distribution
of gifts. Dove reports that the top 10 to 15 donors
commonly account for 50 to 70 percent of total funds
raised [13]. Similarly, a professional consultant estimates
capital campaign fundraising capacity using a rule-of-
thumb that the top 12 donors will contribute 65% of the
revenue [14]. For the sake of discussion, let us refer to
this as the top-12-rule. If we can estimate an expected γ
for the campaign, have an idea of the expected number
of donors N, and know how much to expect from the 12
largest gifts, we can calculate a gain factor G that will
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give an estimate for the campaign total:
Campaign Total = G×
12∑
r=1
S(r)) (10)
where
G =
∑N
r=1 S(r)∑12
r=1 S(r)
(11)
When we apply a power-law model of philanthropic
giving to the top-12-raises-65% rule, we can find circum-
stances for when this rule applies, and when it does not.
Fig. 9 confirms that for campaigns with values of γ in
the 1.8 to 1.9 range (e.g., for higher education), the total
raised is about 1.5 times that of the top 12 donors, and
increases only marginally for a donor pool total of 300
versus 100. But the rule grossly underestimates the total
raised for institutions with larger values of γ. For a cam-
paign with a γ around 2.3 (e.g., for combined purpose
funds) we expect the total raised by 100 donors to exceed
twice that of its top 12, and that 300 donors would triple
the total of its top 12. This analysis would suggest that
the top-12-raises-65% rule is a poor fundraising estimator
for higher values of γ typical of combined purpose funds
and religious organizations, especially for campaigns with
a high number of expected donors.
Note that Fig. 9 is predicated on the assumptions
that we can identify the top 12 donors for a group of
a given size and that a power-law distribution of gifts
applies throughout that donor pool. These assumptions
no longer apply if we then increase the size of the original
donor pool, because gifts from the new donors will not
add serially to the tail of the distribution, but will pop-
ulate all positions throughout the distribution and may
exceed some of the original top 12 gifts as the pool is
enlarged. This would have the effect of raising somewhat
more money than predicted by Fig. 9.
In other words, as a campaign extends its original
scope it may receive a gift within or greater than the orig-
inal top 12. For a power-law model of growth, the total
amount raised tends to grow super-linearly with the total
number of donors: the expected amount raised from 100
donors is more than twice the expected amount raised
from 50 donors (provided the expanded pool of donors
has the same characteristic wealth distribution and inter-
est in the organization as the original pool). This trend,
however, is subject to great variability, and is more pro-
nounced for smaller than larger values of γ. The expected
largest gift from this enlarged group of donors follows the
scaling:
Max gift in group A
Max gift in group B
=
(
# donors in group A
# donors in group B
)1/(γ−1).
(12)
The following example demonstrates the haphazard
variability that this relationship is subject to. Fig. 10A
shows the accumulating total in the order that gifts were
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FIG. 12: Low γ organizations can expect to have greater
year-to-year fundraising volatility than higher γ organiza-
tions. The γ values reported here are averages for all of the
years shown in Figure 1.
received at University of Vermont in 2010. The total
appears to grow linearly for a while, then jumps upwards
when an exceptionally large gift is received.
Fig. 10B shows these gifts broken down into various
time frames. The dotted lines demonstrate how the
expected largest gift grows (per Eq. (9)) as the number of
donors increases. Not surprisingly, the actual largest gift
shows substantial variability around this predicted value.
B. The 80-20 Principle and the Fundraising
Pyramid
Commonly the gifts table (fundraising pyramid) is
predicated on Vilfredo Pareto’s 80/20 principle; that 80%
of funds are raised from 20% of donors [6]. Pareto orig-
inally founded his principle on his observation of the
power-law size distribution of wealth in Italy [15] (the
γ for an 80/20 fundraising relationship varies based on
the number of donors, ranging from 1.82 for 100 donors,
to 2.04 for 5,000 donors). By knowing an organization’s
γ and donor pool size, a fundraiser can develop a giving
pyramid specific to that organization’s gift distribution,
rather than using a generic 80/20 pyramid. Fig. 11 shows
four pyramids, each calculated for an organization with
a specific γ. For each pyramid the lowest level of dona-
tions is set at $200. Organizations with lower values of γ
should plan for much larger gifts at the higher levels than
organizations with higher values of γ, and should expect
to raise much more from the same number of donors.
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FIG. 13: A. ‘Reference” synthetic power law giving distribution with a largest gift of $62,000, N=542 total donors of which the
largest 200 follow a power law with γ = 3.50 is created and labelled Reference, with a fit show between the 5th and 200th gifts.
A comparison is created where each gift from the reference distribution is split into 60%, 25%, 10%, and 5%. A false shoulder is
created with a γ = 3.01, fitting the slope between the 200-th and 700-th donors. B. Gift-size data from an anonymous religious
institution. The blue region appears to represent around $100,000 of unrealized potential in the $1,000 and above range. The
power law slope of γ = 2.04 is found by fitting the gifts from donor 110 to donor 1800, over the region that appears flattest.
C. The giving data from panel B corrected for multiple donations, and a correct γ of 2.73 is found between the 8th and 200-th
donors.
C. What γ says about an organization’s
fundraising capacity and robustness
Low values of γ generally describe organizations whose
largest gifts are extremely large in proportion to the total
amount raised. For example, for a campaign with a γ
of 1.81 (e.g., higher education) and 1000 donations, the
lead gift would be expected to be about 30% of the total
raised. But for a campaign with a γ of 2.47 (e.g., com-
bined purpose fund) the lead gift would be expected to
be about 5% of the total. In contrast to the predictability
of mid-level gifts, lead gifts are subject to enormous vari-
ability about their expected value, as can be seen by their
divergence from the projected line of slope in most of the
data examples presented in this paper. This means that
while low γ institutions are more likely to enjoy the bene-
fit of extremely large gifts, their annual fundraising total
is highly dependent on the gifts of those top few donors
and becomes subject to significant year-to-year variabil-
ity (Fig. 12). In contrast, high γ institutions are likely
to experience more stable year-to-year totals. Note that
United Way of Chittenden County and Einstein School of
Medicine have a similar sized donor base, demonstrating
the fundraising power of a low γ.
D. Misleading Effect of Multiple Donations per
Donor
For proper analysis, data for a given time period must
reflect a single total of gifts from each donor. If the donor
has made multiple gifts, and these gifts are recorded sep-
arately, the number of donors, N , will be falsely inflat-
ed. This can create a false and misleading shoulder on
the institution’s Zipf plot and lead to a miscalculation of
γ. Panel B of Fig. 13 appears to show gifts from 3,500
donors to a(n anonymous) religious institution, with γ of
2.04. There appears to be about $100,000 of unrealized
potential from the larger gifts. In fact, there were only
500 donors, but many of them had made multiple small-
er gifts throughout the year. In panel C, for each year
we properly summed multiple gifts by single donors into
a single total for each donor, and see that γ of 2.04 in
Panel B was entirely due to a false shoulder effect. The
correctly measured γ of 2.73 is more consistent with that
predicted from the donor survey data for religious insti-
tutions from Fig. 6. We now see that the largest gifts in
fact exceeded expectations.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS:
The distribution of gifts received by nonprofit institu-
tions is approximately consistent with a power-law size
model. Individual institutions, and possibly broad of cat-
egories institutions, have their own characteristic scaling
exponent γ. Fundraising projections modeled on power
laws may be useful for predicting the success of a given
campaign, and for affecting the strategic planning of a
campaign.
Future study should assemble a larger database to see
if our findings are consistent, to study if there is a pre-
dictable relationship between the values of γ for an insti-
tution’s annual fund and its capital campaigns, and to
capture values of γ for new philanthropic categories such
as human services and the environment. Different regions
across the globe and within countries may show charac-
teristic local variations for values of γ for income, overall
giving, and by category of institution. Gifts from private
individuals account for 73% of giving; family foundations,
corporate giving, and bequests account for the remain-
der [1]. Analysis of these disparate funding sources may
find characteristic values of γ for gifts based on the cat-
egory of their source in addition to the category of their
destination.
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S1
Supplementary material
All data sets can be downloaded from our present
paper’s online appendix which is located here:
http://www.uvm.edu/storylab/share/papers/
gottesman2014a/.
In this supplementary section, we provide some minor
details for the data used in the main paper. We also
show results of fitting gift size distributions to a num-
ber of potential candidate forms, employing methods of
Maximum Likelihood (ML) for the estimation of param-
eters [8]. Unsurprisingly, a pure power law decay does
not fit the data with great precision. Nevertheless, we
justify our use of a power law size distribution as a rea-
sonable, if rough, characterization of philanthropic gift
size distributions—very much in the manner of standard
linear regression—and hence a suitable building block for
our analyses. Larger, much more exhaustive data sets
across all kinds of institutions will be required to strong-
ly advance our knowledge of philanthropy beyond what
we have achieved here.
1. Further details concerning philanthropic data
For all sources of data in this present work, we made
no distinctions as to whether the donor of a gift was a
living person, a bequest, a foundation, or a corporation.
In the 5 year period 2006 through 2010, the sources of
total giving in dollars were divided as 73% individuals,
8% bequests, 14% foundations, and 5% corporate [1].
For the institutions analysed in the main paper, gift
size specifics were as follows:
• Albert Einstein School of Medicine, University of
Vermont, ECHO Aquarium and Science Center,
and the Flynn Theater provided data for all gifts
received over 5 years. Multiple gifts by a single
donor over a single year were not identified by these
institutions, and hence not summed into a single
gift.
• Mount Sinai Hospital reported all gifts and was able
to identify multiple gifts per year from individual
donors; these were summed into a single gift per
donor per year.
• United Way of Chittenden County likewise identi-
fied multiple gifts which were summed into a sin-
gle gift per donor per year, but was able to pro-
vide data only on gifts received individually. Some
workplaces collect United Way donations and then
send a lump sum: these sums do not reflect indi-
vidual gifts and were not reported to us.
• The anonymous religious institution described their
gifts both as multiple donations per donor per year
and a summed donation per donor per year, per-
mitting construction of Fig. 13.
Individual donations from United States Presidents
and candidates were obtained directly from their tax
returns for the stated years. This data is available direct-
ly at http://www.taxhistory.org/www/website.nsf/
Web/PresidentialTaxReturns. In addition, we include
the data presented here in a CSV file.
2. Scaling parameter fitting
In general, we utilize the ML method to fit our scaling
parameter γ. However, for small data (presidential gifts
and limited tax data) the ML method is biased from the
finite size and we use a linear regression for a rough esti-
mate. To determine the portion of our data that is best
power-law behaved, the minimization of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnoff statistic D proved to be inconsistent across our
data due the multiple minima of the statistic D (Figure
S1). For this reason, we empirically chose the scaling
regions (i.e., the cut offs).
In Tab. S1, we report results for fitting power-law
decay distributions using the ML approach. (In Tab. S3
we perform the same analysis for presidential gifts.)
Some code from both Clauset and Alstott was used, in
addition to our methods [8, 16]. We note that as argued
in Alstott, the p-value of the fitted distribution becomes
less useful for large data sets because the Monte Carlo
generated distributions become nearly perfect [16]. Since
our data is large, we find that in general none of the syn-
thetically generated data sets has D greater than for the
real data (p = 0.00), but this does not rule out power law
behavior.
We then turn to the comparison to other distributions
in Tab. S2 (and Tab. S4 for presidential gifts), and find
that the power law is at least reasonably supported in
most cases. The only test for which statistical signifi-
cance was at least common is for the exponential distri-
bution, and in all cases the power law was favored. For
all distributions where the cutoff power law test was sig-
nificant, in particular the Einstein School of Medicine,
we find that the cutoff power law is favored, and would
be the most likely distribution.
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FIG. S1: The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff statistic D plotted over log10 xmin, where xmin is the minimum value fit for power law
behavior, for the United Way of Chittenden County over the years 2006–2010. D is generated from the ML estimate. Existence
of multiple minima in our data indicate that there are multiple possible fitting regions for which the KS statistic suggests a
good fit. The variability of this value over each year plotted produced widely varying scaling parameters γ, and thus could not
be safely used.
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Institution Year 〈x〉 σ xmax γ Range D p
Mount Sinai Hospital 2009 17618.40 450408.65 37259947 1.92 ± 0.08 1 to 90 0.12 0.00
2010 19348.18 429587.88 27885708 2.02 ± 0.10 1 to 90 0.10 0.00
Einstein School of Medicine 2006 3247.30 46940.29 2000000 1.79 ± 0.02 1 to 2000 0.11 0.00
2007 4768.09 78762.48 5350000 1.71 ± 0.01 1 to 2000 0.15 0.00
2008 10385.80 199751.68 10200000 1.80 ± 0.01 1 to 2000 0.21 0.00
2009 5212.92 139468.89 10000000 1.84 ± 0.01 1 to 2000 0.15 0.00
2010 4917.94 61893.49 2000000 1.80 ± 0.06 1 to 2000 0.15 0.00
Univeristy of Vermont 1974 155.76 2811.94 200000 1.94 ± 0.01 3 to 794 0.18 0.00
1980 284.31 5284.36 326000 1.85 ± 0.03 3 to 794 0.11 0.00
1990 350.23 5382.45 500000 2.16 ± 0.01 3 to 794 0.38 0.00
2000 805.33 15120.53 1488000 1.71 ± 0.03 3 to 794 0.09 0.00
2010 741.40 17029.10 2000000 1.81 ± 0.05 3 to 794 0.13 0.00
United Way, Chittendon County 2004 441.71 1133.02 30000 2.77 ± 0.04 1 to 316 0.21 0.00
2005 464.47 1444.26 50000 2.58 ± 0.22 1 to 316 0.13 0.00
2006 456.86 1199.92 25000 2.42 ± 0.05 1 to 316 0.07 0.00
2007 456.16 1279.14 30000 2.42 ± 0.14 1 to 316 0.07 0.00
2008 287.53 1089.92 45460 2.53 ± 0.00 1 to 316 0.14 0.00
2009 278.93 1122.44 56500 2.55 ± 0.08 1 to 316 0.12 0.00
2010 287.58 1271.10 70518 2.47 ± 0.09 1 to 316 0.08 0.00
ECHO Science Museum 2005 977.77 3153.41 25000 1.66 ± 0.03 2 to 88 0.20 0.00
2006 951.16 3415.22 25000 1.59 ± 0.02 2 to 88 0.28 0.00
2007 941.61 3161.08 25000 1.59 ± 0.07 2 to 88 0.31 0.00
2008 956.88 2688.31 20000 1.56 ± 0.01 2 to 88 0.26 0.00
2009 676.84 2098.96 20000 1.73 ± 0.15 2 to 88 0.17 0.00
Flynn Theater 2006 241.87 1528.82 65065 2.18 ± 0.04 1 to 2000 0.26 0.00
2007 268.54 1732.33 60000 2.15 ± 0.05 1 to 2000 0.25 0.00
2008 248.00 1015.39 27500 2.15 ± 0.00 1 to 2000 0.22 0.00
2009 242.90 1212.42 40000 2.18 ± 0.04 1 to 2000 0.23 0.00
2010 246.13 1606.43 70000 2.09 ± 0.05 1 to 2000 0.22 0.00
TABLE S1: Summary statistics of all of the donation data is presented. The reported γ and range are fit with the MLE
method, and the xmin which was found to minimize the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff statistc D is reported along with D itself. In
this case, lower values of D indicate a better fit.
S4
Log-Normal Exponential Stretched Exp. Cutoff Power Law
Institution Year p LR p LR p LR p LR p
Mount Sinai Hospital 2009 0.00 -0.21 0.67 31.80 0.01 -0.19 0.82 -0.53 0.30
2010 0.00 -0.00 0.99 47.31 0.00 0.46 0.60 -0.23 0.50
Einstein School of Medicine 2006 0.00 -6.22 0.03 378.82 0.00 -7.06 0.03 -8.31 0.00
2007 0.00 -0.30 0.59 17.65 0.01 -0.35 0.61 -0.67 0.25
2008 0.00 -1.03 0.37 1235.22 0.00 0.71 0.81 -2.85 0.02
2009 0.00 -2.48 0.13 578.27 0.00 -2.75 0.22 -5.82 0.00
2010 0.00 -1.52 0.22 842.87 0.00 -0.64 0.80 -5.19 0.00
Univeristy of Vermont 1974 0.00 -0.39 0.54 20.93 0.00 -0.49 0.54 -1.17 0.13
1980 0.00 -0.72 0.41 82.27 0.00 -0.81 0.47 -1.82 0.06
1990 0.00 -0.94 0.36 23.05 0.01 -1.11 0.34 -1.79 0.06
2000 0.00 -0.65 0.45 30.59 0.00 -0.78 0.44 -1.52 0.08
2010 0.00 -∞ 0.00 7.75 0.02 0.39 0.34 -0.00 0.94
United Way, Chittendon County 2004 0.00 -0.46 0.47 28.75 0.00 -0.53 0.55 -1.29 0.11
2005 0.00 -0.08 0.77 54.69 0.00 0.36 0.74 -0.69 0.24
2006 0.00 -0.12 0.71 68.71 0.00 0.44 0.71 -0.85 0.19
2007 0.00 -0.61 0.43 48.21 0.00 -0.65 0.57 -1.64 0.07
2008 0.00 -0.13 0.72 46.52 0.00 0.14 0.90 -0.71 0.23
2009 0.00 -0.35 0.55 48.39 0.00 -0.28 0.80 -1.15 0.13
2010 0.00 -0.32 0.58 35.25 0.00 -0.30 0.77 -0.90 0.18
ECHO Science Museum 2005 0.00 -2.47 0.25 31.43 0.04 -3.04 0.21 -3.56 0.01
2006 0.00 -0.20 0.69 1.42 0.57 -0.28 0.68 -0.53 0.30
2007 0.00 -∞ 0.00 4.56 0.03 0.20 0.35 0.00 1.00
2008 0.00 -∞ 0.00 4.28 0.00 0.29 0.19 0.00 1.00
2009 0.00 -0.87 0.47 31.48 0.01 -1.23 0.44 -2.51 0.03
Flynn Theater 2006 0.00 -0.52 0.46 272.93 0.00 0.32 0.87 -2.80 0.02
2007 0.00 -0.06 0.80 4.53 0.14 -0.08 0.86 -0.26 0.47
2008 0.00 -0.56 0.45 303.73 0.00 0.38 0.86 -3.35 0.01
2009 0.00 -0.25 0.63 281.34 0.00 1.11 0.59 -2.16 0.04
2010 0.00 -3.96 0.07 129.19 0.00 -4.61 0.06 -6.78 0.00
TABLE S2: The results of the Likelihood-Ratio and its associated p-value are reported for different distributions. Here, positive
values lend support to the Power Law and negative values to the other stated distribution. The significance of the LR is p,
where low values of p indicate a trustworthy LR. Values for which p < 0.05 are bolded.
Name Year 〈x〉 σ xmax γMLE xmin D p γLS Range
Romney 2010 94456.52 336755.59 1670000 2.09 ± 0.25 10000 0.11 0.00 1.65 ± 0.13 1 to 23
McCain 2006 11037.59 15077.01 50500 1.88 ± 0.28 4000 0.20 0.00 1.47 ± 0.12 1 to 17
Obama 2011 4413.59 18330.81 117130 3.16 ± 0.39 1000 0.13 0.00 1.96 ± 0.26 1 to 39
HW Bush 1990 749.94 1116.48 5521 3.35 ± 0.61 1000 0.17 0.00 1.79 ± 0.19 1 to 52
Clinton 1992 2083.75 3117.79 10220 2.06 ± 0.43 550 0.15 0.50 1.69 ± 0.12 1 to 8
Nixon 1972 73.75 73.77 200 2.16 ± 0.58 20 0.18 1.00 1.58 ± 0.11 1 to 4
TABLE S3: Summary statistics of all of the Presidential donation data.
Log-Normal Exponential Stretched Exp. Cutoff Power Law
Name Year p LR p LR p LR p LR p
Romney 2010 0.00 -∞ 0.00 28.63 0.00 0.70 0.15 0.00 1.00
McCain 2006 0.00 -0.39 0.60 0.10 0.96 -0.56 0.58 -0.75 0.22
Obama 2011 0.00 -∞ 0.00 55.53 0.00 2.67 0.01 0.00 1.00
HW Bush 1990 0.00 -∞ 0.00 5.27 0.01 0.55 0.09 0.00 1.00
Clinton 1992 0.50 -∞ 0.00 2.58 0.15 0.06 0.78 -0.02 0.83
Nixon 1972 1.00 -∞ 0.00 1.11 0.41 0.03 0.85 -0.03 0.82
TABLE S4: The results of the Likelihood-Ratio and its associated p-value are reported for the presidential candidates.
